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How widely is OPC used as the interface between ICS and IT on OT sites and what are the security measures? In OT security, interfaces like OPC  are very widely used to bridge data between Purdue L2 (Control Network) and Purdue L3 (Operations Network) . This practice is common but comes with significant security considerations. How Widely is OPC Used? OPC Classic and OPC UA (Unified Architecture) are among the most common industrial protocols used for data exchange. OPC interfaces serve as middleware that aggregates and forwards process data (like sensor readings, alarms, or setpoints) from control systems (DCS/PLC/SCADA) at L2 to higher-level systems such as MES (Manufacturing Execution Systems) or historian databases at L3. This kind of data flow is critical for operations management , analytics, and business decision-making. Why It's Common: Most industrial systems are built on the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture , which defines strict segmentatio...

'LNG carrier/FPSO' floating OT on the sea OT refers to hardware and software systems that monitor and control physical processes, especially in industries like energy, oil & gas, and transportation. Special vessels such as LNG Carriers (Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers) and FPSOs (Floating Production Storage and Offloading) are considered floating industrial plants because they have complex automation systems that manage critical industrial processes at sea. These processes directly impact operational safety, efficiency, and environmental compliance. 1. Characteristics of LNG Carriers and FPSOs as OT Systems These vessels contain numerous OT components due to their industrial operations: LNG Carrier - Transporting Liquefied Natural Gas :  An  LNG Carrier  is a specialized ship designed to  transport natural gas in liquid form (LNG) at -162°C . This liquefaction reduces gas volume by  600 times , making long-distance transport efficient. Core Processes...

  Why Secure Remote Access is Crucial in the Era of Autonomous Ships As ships become increasingly autonomous, secure remote access is critical to ensure operational efficiency, cybersecurity, and regulatory compliance. Here’s why: 1. Increased Cyber Threats to Ships Autonomous ships rely on networked control systems , making them more susceptible to cyberattacks like malware, ransomware, and unauthorized access. Hackers could take control of navigation, propulsion, or communication systems , leading to severe consequences. Examples: GPS spoofing , malware injection into onboard systems, or denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on ship networks. 2. Regulatory Compliance (IACS UR E26 & E27, IMO Guidelines) IACS UR E26 & E27 require ships to implement cybersecurity frameworks, ensuring resilience against cyber threats. IMO’s MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 recommends secure remote access methods for operational safety. Non-compliance can lead to detentions, loss of clas...

  Let's talk about  IACS UR E26 and E27 and others   in detail including the scope, timeline, penalties etc. ​ The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) has introduced Unified Requirements (UR) E26 and E27 to enhance the cyber resilience of ships and their onboard systems. Below is a detailed overview of their scope, implementation timeline, and compliance considerations.​ Scope of UR E26 and E27 UR E26: Cyber Resilience of Ships Objective : Establishes minimum requirements for the cyber resilience of ships throughout their design, construction, commissioning, and operational life. ​ Key Functional Aspects: Identify : Maintain an inventory of hardware and software for applicable Computer-Based Systems (CBSs) and document network arrangements. Protect : Implement security zones, network segmentation, access controls, and protections against malicious code. Detect : Monitor network operations and perform verification and diagnost...