SOP for the 'Conficker' Scenario' in OT Environments

-

 


Scenario: Conficker Worm in OT Sites!

Threat Type: Self-propagating malware targeting Windows systems
Impact:

  • Disrupts OT including SCADA, HMI, and ICS workstations
  • Exploits weak passwords & Windows vulnerabilities
  • Spreads via USB devices, network shares, and unpatched systems

THREAT DETECTION & IDENTIFICATION

Step 1: Detect Infection Signs

  • Unusual network traffic & slow system performance
  • Unauthorized account lockouts & failed login attempts
  • Security logs showing Conficker-related activity (e.g., scanning for MS08-067 exploit)

Step 2: Verify Attack Scope

  • Identify affected systems (Windows-based HMIs, engineering workstations, PLC programming devices)
  • Check if the system has MS08-067 vulnerability unpatched
  • Scan for unauthorized scheduled tasks or services

INCIDENT RESPONSE (IMMEDIATE ACTIONS)

Step 3: Contain & Isolate

  • Physically disconnect infected systems from OT network
  • Disable network file-sharing (SMB, NetBIOS, RPC)
  • Block known malicious IPs and disable infected accounts

Step 4: Activate Incident Response Plan

  • Notify OT Security Team & Incident Response Team
  • Escalate to CIRT (Cyber Incident Response Team)
  • Disable auto-run for USB devices across OT systems

THREAT MITIGATION & NEUTRALIZATION

Step 5: Stop the Spread

  • Apply Microsoft Patch MS08-067 on uninfected systems
  • Change all weak or default passwords on OT assets
  • Deploy antivirus & endpoint detection tools with latest Conficker signatures

Step 6: Remove Conficker Worm

  • Run offline malware removal tools (Windows Defender, Stinger, etc.)
  • Delete Conficker-created registry keys & scheduled tasks
  • Restore affected systems from clean, offline backups

SYSTEM RECOVERY & HARDENING

Step 7: Restore & Validate Systems

  • Recover affected OT assets from trusted backups
  • Revalidate SCADA, HMI, and ICS configurations
  • Conduct network-wide scanning to ensure all traces of Conficker are removed

Step 8: Conduct Post-Incident Forensic Analysis

  • Analyze logs from SIEM, IDS, and firewalls to determine infection vector
  • Identify initial infection source (USB drive, unsecured RDP, unpatched system, etc.)

Step 9: Implement Preventive Measures

  • Patch all Windows-based OT systems with the latest security updates
  • Enforce USB device control policies & disable auto-run
  • Deploy Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to restrict unauthorized execution
  • Conduct cybersecurity training for OT personnel on removable media threats

Recap

  • Conficker exploits weak passwords & unpatched systems—strong password policies & security updates are essential.
  • Disable unnecessary services (SMBv1, NetBIOS, RDP) to limit attack surface.
  • Use air-gapped backups and network segmentation to prevent reinfection.

#CPS #OT #XIoT #IoT #IIoT #IoMT #CPSSecurity #OTSecurity #IoTSecurity #CPS보안 #OT보안 #IoT보안

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Don't confuse DCS, PLC and SCADA in front of OT specialists

-
Image
DCS, PLC and SCADA are not the same. If you keep talking only about PLC security in front of the Oil&Gas industry executives where DCS is the main focus, they will not recognize you as a proper expert. We need to understand the characteristics of OT systems such as DCS, PLC, and SCADA accurately, also respect each OT culture uniquely and finally approach the sites in the right way. Don't be confused, here’s a clear and accurate explanation of DCS, PLC, and SCADA . 1. Distributed Control System (DCS) Concept A DCS (Distributed Control System) is an automated control system used for large-scale industrial processes that require continuous operation and high reliability. It consists of multiple controllers distributed throughout the system, which communicate with each other to manage complex processes. Key Features Used in large-scale, continuous processes (e.g., oil refineries, power plants). Decentralized control architecture with multiple controllers working together. Pr...
Read more

Top 20 Threat Scenarios & Playbooks for OT Security

-
Image
A comprehensive list of 20 threat scenarios in OT security along with detailed descriptions and detection rules that can help identify and respond to these threats. This playbook-style table covers different types of attacks—from unauthorized access to insider abuse—with corresponding rules and indicators to alert security teams. # Threat Scenario Detailed Description Detection Rules & Indicators 1 Unauthorized Remote Access Attempt An attacker uses stolen or weak credentials to access OT networks remotely. - Log Analysis: Monitor VPN/RDP logs for unusual login times, geolocation mismatches, and failed/successful login bursts. - User Behavior Analytics (UBA): Alert on deviations from normal remote access patterns. - Anomaly Detection: Trigger an alert when a remote session is initiated from an unusual IP or geographic region. 2 Malware/Ransomware Infiltration in OT Network Malicious code is introduced into the OT network via compromised endpoints or phishing, potentially encr...
Read more

Let's create our own ICS Labs in the VMs!

-
Image
Let's create our own ICS Labs in the VMs: A Step-by-Step Guide Building an Industrial Control System (ICS) lab in a virtualized environment allows security researchers, engineers, and penetration testers to safely simulate industrial networks, study threats, and test security defenses. Below is a detailed step-by-step guide to creating an ICS lab , including HMI, EWS, PLC, and other critical components. 1. Lab Architecture Overview Key Components in an ICS Lab: HMI: Graphical interface for controlling industrial processes. Engineering Workstation (EWS): Used to configure PLCs and SCADA systems. PLC: Controls physical processes (e.g., motors, valves). SCADA System: Supervisory control and monitoring of ICS networks. Historian: Logs and stores process data for analysis. Networking Components: Virtualized switches, routers, and firewalls to segment ICS networks. Attacker Machine: Kali Linux or Metasploit for penetration testing. 2. Choosing the Virtualization ...
Read more